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1. European Integration and the State: Substitute, 
Rescue, Constraint or What? 
The early days of European integration were dominated by federalist visions 
of the Euro-polity. It seemed clear that the EU would sooner or later replace 
the nation-state as the centre of political authority (Haas 1964; Pinder/Pryce  
1969). Even important national political actors strived for the United States 
of Europe which would have reduced the EU’s member states to subunits in 
a large federal state (Jachtenfuchs 2002: 171-82). The dominant academic 
paradigm, neo-functionalism, reflected and rationalized the wide spread ex-
pectation of the coming of a federal Europe.  
When this expectation was shattered first by the failure of the EDC in the 
1950s and by the crisis of the empty chair in the 1960s, and finally collapsed 
with British entry in the 1970s, scientific accounts of European integration 
became more sober and sceptical. Fears or hopes of the EU replacing the 
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member states as central units of political organization and identification 
seemed misplaced and grossly overdrawn.  
Liberal intergovernmentalism argued that member states had the integra-
tion  process under firm control. They created European institutions as a  
means to solving collective action problems and mitigate policy external-
ities, but kept these institutions under close supervision and did not transfer 
any central elements of domestic rule and national sovereignty (defense, po-
lice, taxation, large-scale redistribution) to them (Moravcsik 2002: 607). Ba-
sic institutional and policy issues are decided at key intergovernmental con-
ferences, where e ven ‘good Europeans’ such as the German government are 
motivated by the wish to further sectoral domestic interests rather than a  
federalist ideology (Moravcsik 1998). Also historical accounts seemed to 
confirm that despite all federalist rhetoric, the thrust behind integration was 
to rescue the nation state by European means and not to undermine it (Mil-
ward 1992).  
The recent wave of research on Europeanization is, at least in part, a reac-
tion to the liberal intergovernmentalist claim that states shape the EU and 
not vice versa (Risse/Green Cowles/Caporaso 2001: 14-5). To challenge this 
claim, it focuses not on how domestic interests, policies and structures affect 
the Euro-Polity  but on how they are in turn affected by  it  (Feather-
stone/Radaelli 2003). The research on Europeanization has produced sub-
stantial evidence that European stimuli do indeed change domestic interests, 
policies and structures, thus painting a mirror image to intergovernmental-
ism’s p ortrayal of European integration. Still it shares one fundamental a s-
sumption with its rival, namely that the state remains basically intact as a  
self-contained system of government. While in intergovernmentalism, the 
state appears as a self-contained system of preference aggregation, it is con-
ceived as a self-contained system of rule implementation in Europeanization 
research.  
The assumption of the self-contained state has been criticized from a  
multi-level governance perspective.  Proponents of this perspective claim 
that integration neither simply empowers the state (as in the liberal intergov-
ernmentalist account) nor just constrains it (as in the Europeanization d e-
bate) but transforms the state in a fundamental way. The state i s broken up 
as a self-contained system of rule and embedded in a  larger, overarching 
European system of government. Rather than constituting distinct and sepa-
rate spheres, the national and the European level are  integral parts of a  
multi-level structure in which neither of them is bound to disappear or to - 3 - 
dominate the o ther (Hooghe/Marks 2001, 2003; Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 
2004).  
Given multiple political and institutional links between member states 
and EU institution, the multi-level approach makes intuitive phenomenol-
ogical sense. However, it also raises tough questions. One set of questions 
refers to the Gestalt of the EU-polity. If it is true, that the EU constitutes an 
integrated multi-level system rather than an assemblage of intergovernmen-
tally coordinated national systems, how then does it differ from a federal 
polity? How can we conceive of the EU as being multi-level (in some inter-
esting sense of the word) without at the same time being federal? And if 
multi-level Europe is not federal how can it be powerful enough to break up 
such a formidable institution as the West European nation state? A second 
set of questions refers to the nation state. If it is indeed true, as the multi-
level perspective suggests, that the member states of the EU are absorbed 
into an overarching European system of rule, why is it that they are still per-
ceived as the pre-eminent actors in the European polity? If the level of po-
litical integration is really the European and not the national, why then is it 
not also the focus of political agitation, identification, and loyalty as the old 
neo-functionalists predicted? 
The purpose of this paper is to answer these questions. We want to dem-
onstrate that the EU is indeed a multi-level system although it is not federa-
tion and unlikely to turn federal any time soon. And we want to explain why 
the state remains the central unit of political organization in the EU despite 
being absorbed into this multi-level system. For this purpose, we focus on 
two constitutive powers of the state, the power to tax and the power to l e-
gitimately use force (Tilly 1990; Schumpeter [1918] 1991); (Weber [1922] 
1978), and analyse how they are reconfigured in the process of European 
integration.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section (section 2) we 
give a stylized account of the historical evolution of the power to tax and 
use force in processes of European state formation. By the mid-20
th century, 
states had secured an undisputed legal monopoly of force and taxation and 
virtually exclusive decision making authority over these instruments. As we 
demonstrate in the following sections, the process of European integration 
leads to a fundamental, if rarely acknowledged,  reconfiguration of these 
powers. This reconfiguration is characterized by two contradictory trends. 
On the one hand, the legal monopoly of force and taxation remains exclu-
sively national. There is neither a European police force nor a European tax - 4 - 
– and it i s highly unlikely that there will be any in the near future. The right 
to impose taxes and mandate the use of force remains an exclusive n ational 
prerogative (section 3). On the other hand, the EU increasingly usurps deci-
sion-making authority over internal security and taxation: EU institutions 
decide instead of national governments on issues of tax and internal security 
policy or, at least, pre-structure national decisions. As we will show, these 
decisions are not restricted to secondary issues but affect the core of national 
tax and internal security policy, and they are no longer under tight m ember 
state control (section 4).  
The concluding section (section 5 ) sketches the emerging new order of 
European taxation and internal security. It is decidedly n on-federal because 
the European level lacks the power to tax and mandate the use of force – no 
European taxes or police forces. However, it is multi-level because national 
tax and internal security policies are increasingly guided, controlled and 
constrained by European level decisions. The state remains central because 
the legal monopoly of force and taxation remains national. However, it is 
broken up as a self-contained unit of decision making on taxation and inter-
nal security. These are increasingly co-decided or even pre-empted by Euro-
pean institutions.   
2. The National Monopoly of Force and Taxation 
In this section, we argue that the key feature distinguishing the state from 
other forms of political organization is the monopoly of force and taxation. 
Processes of state formation in Europe evolved around attempts to assert and 
consolidate this monopoly. By the 20
th century this process was complete. 
States enjoyed an undisputed legal claim to the exclusive use of force and 
taxation within their national territories, and possessed the means to enforce 
this claim effectively. 
The modern state was built on money and violence. It emerged in early 
modern Europe as an institutional device for mobilizing force and organiz-
ing extraction. Well into the 19
th century i ts two overriding, and mutually 
reinforcing, concerns were to collect taxes and to raise and deploy armies 
and navies. Since then, the range of state activities has greatly expanded. 
Over the 20
th century, the state has come to deal with policy issues as d i-
verse as social security, gender equality, environmental protection or the or-
ganization of major sporting events. Still the feature that most clearly sets it 
apart from other political institutions is its monopoly of force and taxation: - 5 - 
The state, and only the state, can mandate the use of force and levy taxes 
within the national territory. No other entity is entitled to do so (see e.g. 
Poggi 1990; Tilly 1990; Zürn and Leibfried 2005). 
The monopoly of force and taxation is a matter of law not of fact, of au-
thority not of sheer muscle. It represents a legal claim but not necessarily a  
political reality. As the example of so-called ‘ failed s tates’  clearly 
demonstrates, states are not always able to effectively enforce this claim. 
And even in Western Europe, where the effectiveness of the monopoly of 
force and taxation is usually taken for granted, this has not always been the 
case. In fact, most of the state’s history since the 15
th century was spent on 
asserting  the monopoly and  backing it  up with effective control. In the 
course of a long and laborious process, the state challenged the right of non-
state actors such as the Roman emperor, the church, the cities or the nobility 
to levy their own taxes and make self-mandated use of force, excluded them 
from tax or security related decision making, and entrusted the implementa-
tion of tax and security laws to state agencies.  Private tax farmers were 
replaced by public tax administrators, mercenary armies made way to 
regular armed forces, national police penetrated local communities and local 
police operations were submitted to state control  (Tilly 1990; Reinhard 
1999).  
The assertion and consolidation of the state’s power to tax and use force 
started at different times and proceeded at different speeds in different parts 
of Europe. However, it led to similar outcomes everywhere. By the mid-20
th 
century, taxation and the provision of internal security were characterized by 
two prevailing features in all West European States. First, the state’s 
monopoly of force and taxation was uncontested. It was broadly accepted 
that the state was the only political unit entitled to mandate the use of force 
or levy compulsory payments within its territory. No plausible challenger to 
this monopoly was in sight. The downside to this was that the state also had 
to assume full responsibility for all real or perceived failures of tax or 
internal security policy. Any deficiency or injustice was invariably attributed 
to the state, and to the state and its representatives alone. Second, the state 
enjoyed near-complete decision making control over taxation and internal 
security. In other words, taxes were not only levied, and force applied in the 
name of the state, but also on the basis of state decisions of state organs. The 
state through its government and administration decided what taxes to levy 
and under what conditions to use force. No other political organization inter-
fered with state decisions in these fields.  - 6 - 
The combination of legal monopoly and effective decision-making 
control made European states sovereign in taxation and internal security. 
They used this sovereignty to develop distinctly national systems of taxation 
and internal security. The cross-national variance of policy regimes is well 
recorded and does not need to be demonstrated here (for taxation just see 
Peters 1986; for internal security see Bayley 1985). It is important to stress, 
however, that this variance was rooted in one basic similarity, namely the 
states’ exclusive legal claim to and effective control of taxation and force 
control within the national territory.  
3. No European Monopoly of Force and Taxation 
The process of European Integration leads to a fundamental reconfiguration 
of taxing and policing powers in the EU. While it leaves the member states’ 
legal monopoly of force and taxation intact, and may in fact reinforce it, it 
undermines their effective control over decision making. Taxes and police 
forces remain national but the conditions of their use are increasingly 
defined  and controlled  by European institutions.  The state as a self-
contained unit of policing and taxation is broken up and embedded in an 
increasingly dense network of European rules and regulations. In this section 
we explain why the EU has no  independent tax and police powers and is 
unlikely to get them any time soon. In the following section (section 4) we 
analyse why this has not prevented European institutions from increasingly 
usurping decision making authority over taxation and police matters.  
Unlike its member states, the EU has neither the legal right nor the a d-
ministrative means to apply force or impose taxes. There is no such thing as 
a genuine European army, police force or tax, and, by implication, there is 
also no such thing as a European state (Jachtenfuchs 2006). In the early days 
of European integration, when hopes for a United States of Europe were still 
rising high, the introduction of European level taxes or armed forces a p-
peared as a real prospect. However, as the appeal of the federal vision faded 
with consecutive rounds of e nlargement, this prospect became increasingly 
unreal and utopian. As the EU grew larger and more heterogeneous, its co-
hesion came to depend crucially on its visibly not being a state and on the 
member states visibly remaining states. While there is no consensus as to 
what the EU’s finalité politique is, there is wide spread consensus that it 
cannot and should possibly be a European federal state. This precludes the 
transfer of Europeanization of the most important insignia of statehood: - 7 - 




While the introduction of a genuine European tax is a perennial theme in 
European politics (Neumark Report 1963; Strauss-Kahn 2004), the EU is no 
closer to having a tax of its own today than the ECSC was back in the 
1950s. In fact, it may be farther away. The importance of tax-like suprana-
tional levies for funding the Community budget has decreased, and the i m-
portance of national contributions increased over time. There is a pervasive 
trend towards intergovernmentalism in Community finances. The EU’s so-
called own resource system  has come to closely resemble  the funding 
schemes of international institutions such as the IMF. It is worlds apart from 
the tax systems of federal, let alone unitary nation states.  
When the six founding members established the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1951, they based the funding on a system of suprana-
tional levies on coal and steel production. The levies were to be charged di-
rectly by the ECSC on individual economic agents – companies – and thus 
bore a close resemblance to supranational taxes. The EEC-treaty of 1957 
returned to a classic, intergovernmental funding scheme based on national 
contributions by the member states but made provisions for an eventual 
switch to a new, and supposedly more supranational system of Community 
‘own resources’ (Article 201, now 269). The first own resources assigned to 
the Community in 1971 were customs duties and agricultural levies. Like 
the ECSC levies, these so-called traditional own resources a re charged di-
rectly on economic agents – importers and agricultural producers – and thus 
create a direct, tax-like fiscal link between the Community and individual or 
corporate citizens. However, the agents paying these duties were few in 
number, and did not represent the citizenship at large. Also, they generated 
insufficient resources for funding the Community budget. The so-called 
VAT own resource introduced in 1979, was supposed to alleviate both prob-
lems.  
Initially, the VAT resource was envisaged as a European surcharge on top 
of national VATs. Thus, it would allow the Community to not only tap into 
a buoyant source of revenue but also raise its public profile as a revenue 
raiser in i ts own right. But the surcharge system required a complete har-
monization of the VAT basis across the member states. However, while the - 8 - 
Council agreed on a substantial approximation of the VAT base in 1977, a  
complete harmonization proved elusive. The surcharge approach was given 
up and replaced by a statistical approach of calculating VAT resource dues 
from data on macroeconomic consumption. This was administratively con-
venient and reduced the pressure for further VAT harmonization. But it fun-
damentally changed the character of the VAT resource from direct European 
charge on final consumers to national contribution by member states. D e-
spite its name, there is no straightforward connection between the European 
VAT resource and national VATs. Rather it is a transfer from national treas-
uries to the EU paid out of general revenues (Genschel 2002: 80-90).  
The trend from direct charges to national contributions was f urther rein-
forced by the introduction of the so-called GNI-based own resource in 1988. 
In contrast to the VAT resource, it was conceived right from the beginning 
as a transfer from national treasuries rather than a direct charge on European 
citizens. It is calculated as a fixed share of the gross national income of the 
member states without even notional reference to microeconomic events or 
actors. While initially planned as a residual source of finance, it has devel-
oped into the main stay of the Community budget. In 2005 it accounted for 
roughly 3/4 of all own resources. Add to this the VAT resource and almost 
90 percent of Community own resources derive from national contributions 
(European Commission 2004: technical annex p. 8). 
In conclusion, there is a pervasive trend in Community finance away 
from direct charges on individual or corporate citizens towards national con-
tributions by the member states, i.e. from supranational to intergovernmental 
sources of revenue. This trend is reflected by pervasive concerns about inter-
nation equity, which have dominated political debates o n the Community 
budget ever since Margaret Thatcher demanded her money back in 1979. 
The main cleavage in these debates is between states (net-payers and net-
recipients), not between social classes, the main reference points are inter-
nation equity and national ability to pay rather than inter-person distributive 
justice and individual ability to pay.  
To be sure, the trend towards intergovernmentalism in Community fund-
ing is often perceived as pathological. In the eyes of the Commission, it fos-
ters ‘a narrow “juste retour” stance’ of the member states and deflects atten-
tion from general merits of EU policies for Europe as a whole. A direct fis-
cal link between European and citizen level should be (re-)established in 
order to reduce this bias and vindicate the EU as ‘a Union of Member States 
and citizens’ (European Commission 2004: technical annex p. 41, 58). Also, - 9 - 
statesmen continue to air the idea of a genuine European tax, showing just 
how visionary they are about the EU  (e.g. Strauss-Kahn 2004; Schüssel 
2006). However, the visionary potential of the idea testifies to its lack of po-
litical plausibility. Giving taxing powers to the EU would bestow on it a de-
gree of ‘stateness’ that is unacceptable to most of its citizens and govern-
ments. As the EU grows more heterogeneous with each round of enlarge-
ment, and as a limit to future enlargement is not in sight, the cohesion of the 
Union comes to increasingly depend on its not being a state. This all but 
rules out genuine European taxes and makes the creation of a direct fiscal 
link to individual citizens exceedingly difficult.  
 
3.2 Internal Security 
The debate whether the EU should have its own taxes was motivated by the 
necessity of financing the EU. The broader political agenda of the EU was 
concerned with the management of the consequences of economic interde-
pendence. States created the EU as a response to pressures from domestic 
economic agents (Frieden 1989; Milward 1984; Moravcsik 1998; Rogowski 
1989). Effects of economic interdependence and potential gains from coop-
eration was real in the economic realm and was perceived by the relevant 
actors. This also applied to the failed attemps to create a European D efence 
Community in the early 1950s. In the emerging Cold War constellation, it 
made sense to cooperate in the field of defense and accept the losses of sov-
ereignty entailed by that cooperation faced with a threatening adversary.  
While clear motives and n ecessities exited in the fields of taxation, mar-
ket creation and external security, they were absent absent in the field of in-
ternal security. Only convinced European federalists who wanted to create 
the United States of Europe thought of giving the EU a grip on internal secu-
rity as the monopoly of force belonged to the attributes of a state. But this 
view remained marginal. Virtually all other political actors did not consider 
the creation of a European monopoly of force. For them, internal security 
was clearly a national issue which was not subject to problems of interna-
tional interdependence and could therefore be dealt with at the national 
level. A look into the literature indeed reveals t he striking difference b e-
tween accounts of national economic or external security policy-making on 
the one hand and accounts of internal security on the other. In the case of the 
former international issues and interdependence started playing a substantive 
role already in the 19
th century whereas it is almost absent in accounts of the - 10 - 
development of police systems. Histories or comparative studies of the de-
velopment of national systems of policing and of internal security read like 
accounts of pathdependent developments shaped exclusively by domestic 
concerns. As a result, national systems of internal security vary enormously 
because there was no unifying external force that influenced them ( Bayley 
1985; Knöbl 1998; Emsley 1996). The only sectors where interdependence 
existed to some degree were the fields of terrorism and  of illicit drugs 
(Busch 1999; Gal-Or 1985; McAllister 2000). As both were located at a  
global rather than a regional scale, they were mainly dealt with by the 
United Nations (and to a lesser degree by the Council of Europe). Overall, 
however, international institutions in the field of internal security remained 
weak (Anderson 1989). And as practically no incentive for cooperation ex-
isted, cooperation in Europe remaind highly informal or ad hoc at best and 
thus far away from a European monopoly of force. 
In the 1970s, interdependencies slightly increased. Member states started 
to perceive the need for information exchange in the field of terrorism. Their 
main focus of activity with respect to both terrorism and drugs remained the 
United Nations (and to some degree the Council of Europe). Only in 1975 
the heads of state and of government at their Rome meeting founded the 
TREVI framework as a reaction to domestic terrorism in a number of mem-
ber states and its suspected international linkages. This framework was an 
informal intergovernmental structure and served mainly as a forum for i n-
formation exchange on terrorism on the level of police officers. It was a c-
companied by a working group on judicial cooperation which was situated 
in the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC, the foreign pol-
icy branch). During the 1970s, the main forum of activity was not the EU 
but the Council of Europe in the field of terrorism and the UN drugs regime 
with respect to trade and consumption of illicit drugs. The result of  the 
TREVI and judicial cooperation efforts was mostly the development of a  
differentiated organizational structure used to dealing with police issues and 
a sense for the important and potentially touchy issues (Busch 1995: 306-
19). Only a few decisions had been taken, and they were not binding (Müller 
2003: 252-4). In order to deal with the consequences of international inter-
dependence in the field of internal security, member states resorted to tradi-
tional concepts of interntional cooperation. No monopoly of force was 
needed or asked for. 
The ‘1992’ initiative which led not only to the completion of the internal 
market but also to the abolition of border controls among the Schengen - 11 - 
group substantially increased the interdependence between the member 
states. 9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings strongly reinforced the 
percieved problem pressure. However, the continued to be dealt with by i n-
tensified international cooperation. A European monopoly of force or even a 
sharing of the monopoly of force between the EU and its member states are 
as far away as in the 1970s. 
4. The Growth of European Decision-Making Author-
ity Over the Use of Force and Taxation 
While the EU is not a state, its basic purpose is to create conditions similar 
in terms of unity and indivisibility to those within a state. This purpose is 
enshrined in concepts such as the ‘Internal Market’ or the ‘Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’, and requires, first and foremost, the abolition of barri-
ers to cross-border movements within the Union. T he abolition of such bar-
riers has major repercussions for national systems of taxation and internal 
security, firstly, because national tax laws and internal security regulations 
are potential barriers to movement in their own right, and, secondly, because 
cross-national differences in taxation and internal security can distort the 
direction and volume of cross-border flows. As we demonstrate in this sec-
tion, these repercussions have resulted in considerable de jure and de facto 
constraints on national decision making autonomy. While the member states 
retain their monopoly of tax and force, they are no longer free to decide on 
how to put it to work. Decision making authority increasingly drifts to 




The EU has no independent power to tax. However, it has the power to 
regulate the taxing powers of the member states. This power derives from, 
and is limited to, the purpose of completing the Internal Market. The Inter-
nal Market is defined as an ‘area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’ (TEC Art. 14). 
Since goods, persons, services, and capital also constitute the major tax 
bases of the member states – in fact, there is little else worth taxing – the 
EU’s competence for completing the Internal Market implies a residual right - 12 - 
to interfere with national tax policy wherever it conflicts with this goal, i.e. 
where national tax laws hinder or distort cross-border flows of goods, ser-
vices and factors of production.  
Since it implicates the very core of national sovereignty, the member 
states have tried to keep the EU competence over taxation as limited, and its 
exercise as dependent on national approval as much as possible. This is i l-
lustrated most clearly by the resilience of the unanimity r ule in tax matters 
(see Article 93 for indirect and article 94 for direct taxation). Ever since the 
Single European Act, the Commission has called for an extension of quali-
fied majority voting to issues of tax harmonization in order to facilitate deci-
sion making (see most recently European Commission 2003) but invariably 
met with staunch opposition from sovereignty-minded member states (just 
see Parts 2003; Straw 2003; Department of Foreign Affairs 2005).  
The resilience of the unanimity rule is often criticized. The Commission 
complains about a ‘growing gap between decisions needed in the tax field to 
achieve the goals of t he Community … and the actual results’ (European 
Commission 2001: 3-4), and is seconded by policy experts who view t he 
unanimity rule as the single most important obstacle to the completion of the 
Internal Market (e.g. Vanistendael 2002).  
What is less often noted is that, common complaints notwithstanding, the 
unanimity rule has not prevented a considerable drift of decision making 
authority in tax matters to the EU level. This drift started first, and is most 
dramatic, in indirect taxation
1, where roughly 120 Council directives (Uhl 
2007: 60) prescribe en detail the systems, base definitions, (minimum) tax 
rates, and administrative routines to be used by the member states in charg-
ing general (VAT) and specific (excises) taxes on consumption. In the field 
of direct taxation, the same development started later but is also substantial. 
A small number of directives regulate the taxation of multinational compa-
nies in the member states. Additional restrictions are imposed by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice’s restrictive reading of the implications of the four ba-
sic freedoms of the Treaty for corporate and personal income taxes. Finally, 
the Commission’s competition policy under the state aid provisions also 
adds to these constraints.  
All major taxes are now subject to EU law. EU regulations pre-form and 
sometimes even pre-empts national tax policy choices even in areas not d i-
rectly covered by them. The European VAT and excises law, for example, 
     
1   Indirect taxation includes, most importantly, taxes on general consumption (VAT) and 
specific goods (excises). - 13 - 
restricts the freedom of national governments to experiment with new taxes 
or new forms of tax collection (Uhl 2007). The Estonian government is 
forced to give up its experiment of replacing the conventional corporate tax 
with a new tax on corporate distributions because the new tax, allegedly, 
violates EU rules on the taxation of multinational companies (Devereux and 
Sørensen 2006: 45-47). The strict enforcement of the four freedoms in cor-
porate taxation fuels tax competition and thus constrains national autonomy 
in tax rate choice (Ganghof and Genschel 2007). In short, w hile taxes con-
tinue to be raised only at the national level, their composition and design is 
increasingly decided at the European level.  
Why did the unanimity rule not prevent the drift of decision making au-
thority to the EU? Four mutually reinforcing mechanisms help to account 
for this outcome: executive self-interest (Moravcsik 1997), rhetorical e n-
trapment; Schimmelfennig 2003), the joint-decision trap  (Scharpf 1988,  
2006), and Court activism (Alter 2001). Executive self-interest explains why 
member state governments have often preferred tax harmonization to non-
harmonization despite its constraining effect on national decision making 
autonomy. Rhetorical entrapment elucidates why the Commission was, at 
times, able to talk member state governments into unwanted tax harmoniza-
tion. The joint decision trap explains how member states become locked-in 
to tax harmonization measures once adopted. Court activism explains how 
the constraining effect of established harmonization directives and, more 
importantly, EU treaty law on national tax policy making can increase con-
siderably even in the absence of political consent of member state govern-
ments.  
Executive self interest: It is a central tenet of rational choice theory that 
self-imposed constraints can be empowering (Elster 1979). Applying this 
tenet to intergovernmental bargaining, some analysts have argued that mem-
ber state governments often agree to new constraining EU law in order to 
strengthen their position in domestic politics  (Grande 1996; Moravcsik 
1997; Wolf 2000). This argument may also apply to tax harmonization. Case 
study evidence suggests that the member state governments pursued the 
harmonization of indirect taxation not only as a means to the European end 
of completing the Internal Market, but also a means to reforming their n a-
tional tax systems. Take VAT as an example. Since the 1960s, it was widely 
agreed among public economists and tax policy makers that a broad based 
VAT is the optimal form of taxing general consumption (Cnossen 1998). 
Acting on this consensus was made difficult by domestic political resistance. - 14 - 
Small businesses opposed the introduction of VAT because they feared 
more administrative red tape and an increased tax burden. Interest groups 
lobbied for favourable tax treatment of various goods and services, thus pos-
ing a constant threat to maintaining a broad based VAT. By agreeing on a  
common VAT system in 1967 and the main ingredients of a common VAT 
base in 1977, governments made it easier for themselves to keep this domes-
tic opposition at bay (Puchala 1984; Genschel 2002). A similar argument 
can be made for the harmonization of excises. It also facilitated a reform 
trend towards simpler and administratively less burdensome taxes on spe-
cific goods that member state governments pursued for purely domestic rea-
sons. This is not to say, however, that all agreed harmonization measures are 
always perfectly in line with the domestic policy preferences of the member 
states. 
Rhetorical entrapment: Member state governments are often torn b e-
tween a general commitment to advancing European integration and specific 
policy preferences that conflict with this goal. They endorse, for example, 
the Internal Market as a matter of principle but oppose concrete steps t o-
wards market integration on the grounds of material interest. By exposing 
the inconsistency between words and deeds, the Commission – or other ac-
tors with a material stake in increased integration – can sometimes manage 
to shame governments into agreement on specific integration acts they 
would have preferred to avoid (see also Elster 1989; Schimmelfennig 2001). 
This mechanism also operates in tax harmonization as exemplified by the 
introduction of the so-called transitional system of VAT in 1991 (Genschel 
2002). Since the 1960s, the Commission had called for the elimination of 
special tax formalities on cross-border trade in the name of unrestricted eco-
nomic exchange among the member states. However, the member states 
were reluctant to heed this call because they relied on these formalities as a 
means of keeping a check on the national VAT base.  
When in March 1985, the European Council asked for a program for the 
completion internal market, the Commission seized this opportunity to coax 
the member states into revising this position: Without elimination of tax 
controls on cross-border trade, it told them in its now famous White Paper, 
the Internal Market would remain fundamentally incomplete  (European 
Commission 1985). Eager to  vindicate their commitment to ‘ 1992’, the 
member states grudgingly agreed to reform the tax treatment of cross-border 
trade. While they still refused to abandon special controls altogether, as d e-
manded by the Commission, they decided to move them from customs posts - 15 - 
at the border to tax offices behind the border. This allowed for the abolition 
of tax-related frontier controls, and, hence, an Internal Market without 
‘physical barriers’ but at the price of decreasing the effectiveness of con-
trols. By agreeing on the transitional system, the member states thus inad-
vertently contributed to the increase in VAT-fraud that they now often com-
plain about and that the Commission cites as proof of the need for further 
VAT integration. The drive for a common consolidated corporate tax base 
provides a more recent example of the Commission trying to exploit the 
member states’ rhetorical commitment to market integration to cajole u n-
willing governments into tax harmonization measures they would wish to 
avoid.  
Joint decision trap: T he unanimity rule makes it difficult not only to 
adopt harmonization measures but also to revise them once adopted. Since 
any revision requires consensus again, change is difficult. And the difficulty 
increases as each consecutive round of enlargement increases the number of 
member states. As a consequence, member state governments may be locked 
in to EU tax laws they no longer consider appropriate – if they ever did so. 
In 2006, the governments of Austria and Germany contemplated a national 
switch to the so-called reverse charge system of collecting VAT in order to 
combat VAT fraud. Since this system deviates from the harmonized princi-
ples laid down in the sixth VAT directive, they asked the Commission for 
derogations.
2 The Commission refused to grant these derogations ‘insofar as 
they would make life more complicated, rather than simpler both for taxable 
persons and tax administrations in addition to providing more, rather than 
less scope for tax evasion’ (European Commission 2006: 6). Whatever the 
merit of this judgement, it i s interesting to note that it is the European 
Commission which decides on the efficiency and effectiveness of proposed 
national tax reforms, not the national governments concerned. The only way 
for Germany and Austria to overrule the Commission’s decision is by con-
vincing their 25 fellow governments to agree to a harmonized switch to the 
reverse charge system, which, of course, is exceedingly difficult. They are 
thus locked-in to the current system of collecting VAT even though they 
consider it inappropriate for their specific needs.  
Court activism: Precisely because the unanimity rule makes it difficult for 
the Council to make and amend EU tax law, it gives considerable leeway to 
the European Court of Justice to create judge-made tax law (Alter 1998; 
     
2   The derogation would have needed the unanimous consent of the Council to become 
effective.  - 16 - 
Scharpf 2006). By reading harmonization directives differently, and more 
narrowly than originally intended by the member states, it can increase the 
specificity and constraining effect of EU law. For example, when the Coun-
cil failed to achieve the complete harmonization of the VAT base intended 
by the Commission with its sixth VAT directive i n 1977, the Commission 
brought ‘a hundred bloody VAT infraction cases for not dotting this I or not 
crossing this t’ (Hahn 1988:230) to increase the restrictiveness of this direc-
tive beyond what the member states had originally agreed to in the Council. 
More importantly, by reading tax policy implications into general provisions 
of the Treaty, the ECJ can create European tax law in areas where the mem-
ber states never agreed to have any such law in the first place. This is espe-
cially important in corporate and personal income taxation, where the num-
ber of harmonization directives is very limited. Here the Court has, in recent 
years, struck down a great number of national tax provision as violating the 
four freedom guarantees of the Treaty. In this way, it has established robust 
European rules for non-discrimination of cross-border income streams. 
These rules not only forced member states to adjust their tax systems and tax 
base definitions, for example, by abandoning purportedly discriminatory 
imputation systems of corporate taxation or by allowing for cross-border 
loss-offset between related companies (Graetz and Warren 2006). In so do-
ing, they also made it easier for taxpayers to shift profits to low-tax and de-
ductible expenses to high-tax member states in order to reduce their overall 
tax bill, and, thus, contribute to fuelling European corporate tax competition. 
This competition has significant push-on effects on personal income taxa-
tion, and, arguably, is one of the main drivers behind the pervasive trend to-
wards replacing comprehensive and progressive income taxes by either dual 
income taxes or flat taxes (Ganghof and Genschel 2007). There is no reason 
to suppose that the member states would have unanimously agreed to any of 
these judge-made rules, had they had the chance to vote on them in the 
Council of Ministers. When, for example, the Commission proposed a direc-
tive to liberalize foreign loss offset in the early 1990s, it was blocked by the 
Council (Genschel 2002: 213).  
The four mechanisms  –  executive self-interest, rhetorical entrapment, 
joint decision trap, and Court activism – do not operate in separation but 
feed on each other. The activism of the ECJ can change the default condi-
tion of intergovernmental negotiations in the Council of Ministers and thus 
shape the definition of executive self-interest. While governments may not 
find tax harmonization in their interest in the absence of Court rulings, they - 17 - 
may well do so in the presence of court rulings. In fact, one major selling 
point of the Commission’s project of a common consolidated corporate tax 
base is to protect the member states from an uncontrolled, and piecemeal 
elimination of discriminatory tax barriers between national corporate tax 
systems by ECJ litigation (European Commission 2003). The Courts restric-
tive interpretation of the four freedoms although vindicates the Commission 
expansive reading of the tax policy implications of the Internal Market and, 
thereby, reinforces the effectiveness of rhetorical entrapment. The joint deci-
sion trap provides the ECJ with material to work on, and in turn, prevents 
the Court from being overruled by the Council.  
As a consequence of these intersecting and mutually reinforcing proc-
esses the national power to tax is now embedded in and disciplined by a  
dense network of European rules and regulations. The member states are 
still the only political units with a right to levy tax but which tax they levy 
and how they levy it is increasingly decided at the European level. Tax lev-
els continue to vary widely, but tax systems, bases and rate structures come 
to look increasingly alike.  
 
4.2 Internal Security 
After the slow beginnings in the 1970s, the Europeanization of decision-
making authority in the field of internal security took off in the early 1990s. 
The causes of this development are the spill-over from the internal market 
program, later intensified by an increased rhetorical commitment of member 
states to the maintenance of internal security in the aftermath of 9/11, and 
court activism.  
Spill-over:  The first and most decisive cause for the development of 
much more extended and intrusive rules came from the initiative to com-
plete the internal market by 1992. This initiative was conceived of as a  
largely economic project for more competitiveness, growth and jobs. In or-
der to ease transactions between the member states, internal borders should 
be abolished. What sounded like the necessary requirement of market crea-
tion and the fulfilment of Euro-enthusiasts’ dreams amounted to a political 
revolution the consequences of which are still not completely visible: With 
the abolition of borders, the state loses a key instrument of control over what 
happens inside its borders. While the abolition of internal borders was the 
most important single measure of ‘negative integration’ in the EU, its per-- 18 - 
ceived consequences lead to what neofunctionalists used to call ‘spill-over’ 
from market regulation to internal security issues.  
As a result, cooperation moved from informal exchange among police 
experts to formal law-making activity and dramatically increased in scope 
and intensity. Whereas internal security (or justice and home affairs) was not 
a formal EU competence in the mid-1980s when the internal market initia-
tive was designed, the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 already formalized and 
consolidated the existing forms of cooperation into what became known as 
the ‘third p illar’ of the EU. The sensitivity of the issues dealt with in this 
pillar are illustrated by the fact that decision-making in the Third Pillar was 
fundamentally different from the classical Community method in that the 
European Commission did not possess the monopoly of initiative, the Euro-
pean Parliament did not co-legislate and the European Court of Justice was 
not allowed to adjudicate. This setup was substantially changed only six 
years later in the Amsterdam Treaty where some parts of the Third Pillar 
(asylum and migration) were moved into the Community area and the scope 
of the issue area was extended.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the member states had concluded a  
substantial number of international conventions in order to move forward in 
the field of internal security without having a sufficient legal basis in Euro-
pean law. The most important examples of a larger set are the Schengen Im-
plementation Agreement of 1990, the Europol Convention of 1995 and the 
Prüm Treaty of 2005. While the Amsterdam Treaty substantially simplified 
the adoption of these conventions which now if ratified by half of the mem-
ber states enter into force for those states it also introduced the instrument of 
‘framework decisions’ in order to further ease decision-making. Framework 
decisions are similar to directives in the Community legal framework and 
are now being increasingly used. 
Finally, the EU member states adopted a number of action plans and pro-
grammes from the ‘Palma document’ of 1989 to the Hague program of 2005 
with a substantial number of programs in between.  Although these pro-
grams were not legally binding, they are an indicator of the importance of 
the matter for member states and constitute a measure against which their 
actions could be assessed. 
After the spill-over pressure from the abolition of internal borders in the 
context of the internal market program, the second strong impulse in the 
field of justice and home affairs came from 9/11. Whereas the abolition of 
internal borders had mainly led to the establishment of the policy field at the - 19 - 
EU level, 9/11 increased its importance and even further intensified its pace. 
Most notably, 9/11 eased the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant, a  
major change in EU police cooperation (see below).  
Although justice and home affairs started much later than taxation as a  
substantial activity of the EU, its development in less than 20 years has been 
dramatic. Both the scope (in terms of the range of issues covered) and the 
depth (in terms of the compulsory nature of the measures adopted) have 
strongly increased. In terms of depth, justice and home affairs has moved 
from informal cooperation over international law conventions outside of the 
EU framework to binding intergovernmental decisions similar to the ones to 
be found in the Community area of the EU and partly to a communitariza-
tion. In terms of scope, the initial focus on serious crime and terrorism has 
been substantially extended and now covers asylum, migration, terrorism 
and organized crime of a much broader range, criminal law including crimi-
nal law aspects of Community policies and the protection of external bor-
ders. The dramatic increase in activity and the potential impact on the state’s 
ability to use its monopoly of force without external interference is nicely 
captured by a study which looked at the degree to which legislation of the 
German Bundestag in specific issue areas was influenced by EU inputs.  
 
Table 1: Bundestag Legislation in an Issue Area Influenced by European 


































Affairs   4.4  2.3  14.5  11.9  19.2  12.9 
Justice   9.8  35  20  21.6  34.1  42.2 
…  …  …  …  …  …  … 
Average  16.8  19.9  24.1  25.9  34.5  34.6 
Source: Töller 2006: 7; ET = electoral term 
 
The table nicely captures the increasing degree to which legislative activ-
ity in justice and home affairs was influenced by the EU as well as the dra-
matic increase after the decision on the internal market program in 1985 and 
the boost after 9/11.  
Apart from this increase in the scope and depth of activity which gives a  
rough overview of the changes in the policy field over the years, major - 20 - 
qualitative changes have also occurred in important substantive issues. 
Member states have pooled their competencies in key areas, and there is 
even a certain degree of delegation in some instances. These changes will be 
subsequently discussed.  
One of the most important developments is the transformation of the tra-
ditional extradition regime towards the European Arrest Warrant. This is a 
key issue for the exercise of the state monopoly of force because it regulates 
the way persons who have been arrested are transferred to another country. 
As arresting people is a fundamental intrusion into personal liberty, it is 
something that only the state is authorized to do under certain precisely cir-
cumscribed procedures. As it is the manifestation of the state’s monopoly of 
force, external interference is not desired. Therefore, the transfer of arrested 
people from one state to another has been subject to mostly bilateral treaties 
of extradition. The dominance of a bilateral approach already shows that 
states wanted to keep the issue under firm control and deal with it on a case-
by-case basis. Two important features of this extradition practice are impor-
tant here: states usually do not extradite persons ‘automatically’ if certain 
predefined conditions are met but reserve the right for a political decision on 
the concrete case, and states reserve the right to exclude certain categories of 
offenses (usually ‘political’ ones such as terrorism). Serveral countries r e-
fuse to extradite their own citizens. This reflects the view that states are sov-
ereign in deciding whom they arrest and do not allow external interference 
(Bassiouni 2002). 
This model preserved sovereignty and autonomy in the exercise of the 
monopoly of force. However, the price to be paid was efficiency: sover-
eignty concerns made it made it more difficult for states to get hold of seri-
ous offenders. As a consequence, the Council of Europe had tried to estab-
lish a multilateral convention on extradition in the hope that this might easy 
prosecution and extraditions among its democratic members. However, the 
European Convention on Extradition of 1957 has numerous declarations an-
nexed to it specifying exceptions. The United Kingdom even refused to sign 
the convention altogether. After the new legal basis provided by the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the EU member states adopted a convention on a simplified 
extradition procedure among themselves (EU Council 1995). But the key 
problem remained: arresting, punishing and extraditing individuals is the 
most visible sign of the state monopoly of force and subject to highly differ-
ent national systems of norms and regulations which had developed inde-
pendently of each other and taken very different forms.  - 21 - 
The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) was adopted in 2002 (EU Council 
2002). Preparations had been under way for some time but 9/11 clearly 
eased the final decision. The EAW is a fundamental break with the past. 
First, its coverage is very broad and includes terrorism as well as rape or ar-
son (32 offenses altogether). Second, the principle of double criminality 
does not apply. In other words, a person can be arrested on the basis of an 
EAW even if the crime does not exist in the jurisdiction of the state where 
the person is currently located. Third, there is no political decision whether 
to extradite or not but only a legal-procedural check. Fourth, states are re-
quired to arrest their own citizens and transfer them to the requesting state. 
The whole procedure should not last longer than three months.  
The EAW is explicitly based on the principle of mutual recognition. 
When this principle was formulated by the ECJ’s famous Cassis de D ijon 
decision in 1979 it was also considered as a revolution. But product safety 
standards, as important as they are, are different from criminal procedures 
and penal law. The general acceptance of the principle of mutual recognition 
is not restricted to the European Arrest Warrant but offers the basis for a fur-
ther horizontal delegation of sovereignty in the field of criminal justice, e.g. 
in the case of the still pending decision on the European Evidence Warrant. 
The European Arrest Warrant was used here to illustrate with a qualitia-
tive example the quantitative evidence given above on the increase in scope 
and depth of EU activities in justice and home affairs. Although it will cer-
tainly lead to a relative small share in the total number of arrests, and a l-
though there are still loopholes and reservations, its significance should not 
be underestimated. It is a clear limitation of state sovereignty in the field of 
the use of the monopoly of force: States are not free to decide whom to ar-
rest on their territory and what to do with these people. The principle 
adopted is an innovative one and might indicate the general way EU mem-
ber states are dealing with the monopoly of force. It does not generate a su-
pranational monopoly of force or a supranational police authority (a Euro-
pean ‘FBI’). It also does not allow the police forces of one state to make ar-
rests on the territory of another state. Instead, it makes the police forces of 
one state act on behalf of another state and without much room for individ-
ual discretion. It is thus a case of horizontal delegation – not to an independ-
ent supranational entity (as e.g. in the field of monetary policy and the Euro-
pean Central Bank) but in a generalized form to other EU member states. 
The EU member states have given up a decade-long practice and have - 22 - 
pooled their sovereignty for the definition of criteria of a small but important 
area where they delegate the use of their monopoly of force to each other. 
Court activism: Initially, the member states had taken great care to avoid 
delegation of adjudication powers in justice and home affairs to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. During the informal cooperation before the Maastricht 
Treaty, it did not have any powers. In the Maastricht Treaty, the ECJ was 
only allowed to decide about convention adopted under Art. K.3 (2) (c) and 
Art. L, and only if the member states had agreed to this role. However, Art. 
M also stipuleded that the provisions of the Treaty on European Union 
should not affect the EC Treaties. This opened up an entry point for the ECJ 
to deal with criminal law aspects of Community Policies. Later, it was de-
cided that the ECJ was also competent ‘ to give preliminary rulings on the 
validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, on the i n-
terpretation of conventions established under this title and on the validity 
and interpretation of the measures implementing them’ (Art. 35 (1) TEU). 
Again, member states have to acknowledge the right of the ECJ to become 
active in a preliminary ruling procedure.  
Still, we see the general pattern of development in justice and home a f-
fairs: The ECJ becomes increasingly involved. Whereas it could only adju-
dicate on conventions in the Maastricht Treaty, its scope of activity is now 
expanded. Both avenues for ECJ involvement, the link between the Com-
munity and the Third Pillar, and the possibility of preliminary rulings, led to 
a number of ECJ rulings. Two of them are of particular importance. In case 
C-176/03 (Commission vs. Council), the ECJ decided on the criminal jus-
tice competence of the Commission and annulled the Framework Decision 
on the criminal justice protection of the environment. In case C-105/03 (Pu-
pino), the ECJ ruled that framework decision 2001/22/JI on the protection of 
victims had direct effect – despite the wording of Art. 34 (2) (b) of the TEU 
which stipulates that framework directives ‘shall not entail direct effect’.  
Although the latter ruling in particular is highly controversial, it is clear 
that the ECJ is taking an increasingly active stance in justice and home af-
fairs and seems willing to shape this area with the same decisiveness it has 
shaped Community policies – with the difference that this time, it is much 
closer to the state monopoly of force. - 23 - 
5. Multi-level but not Federal: Taxation and Internal 
Security in the EU  
European integration affects taxation and internal security in two, partly 
contradictory, ways. On the one hand, it leaves the member states’ monop-
oly of force and taxation intact and may even strengthen it. On the other 
hand, it causes an incremental drift of decision making power from national 
governments to European institutions. Taxation and policing remain entirely 
national in the sense of being performed exclusively by national authorities 
and solely on the basis of national law. They are Europeanized in the sense 
that the conduct of national authorities is increasingly subject to European 
supervision and the content of national law is increasingly moulded or even 
pre-empted by European law. In this section we review the causes behind 
these opposite trends, and consider the shape of the multi-level structure 
created by them.  
The major reason why European integration has left the national monop-
oly of force and taxation unscarred is enlargement. As the EU grows larger 
and more heterogeneous the appeal of the federal vision fades. The Dutch 
and French referenda on the Constitutional Treaty have shown dramatically 
that the old neo-functionalist idea of the EU eventually replacing the mem-
ber states as the centre of political authority curries little favour with voters. 
To the contrary, the legitimacy of the Union now seems to hinge on not visi-
bly threatening the continued political pre-eminence of the member states. 
This makes it impossible to bestow European institutions with the most i m-
portant and visible insignia of national statehood, namely the power to tax 
and use force. Since the British entry in 1973 at the latest, the chances of a 
genuine European tax let alone a European army or police force seem close 
to zero.  
While resistance to the idea of a European super-state is pronounced and 
widespread, there is hardly any resistance to the EU’s animating purposes 
being defined as creating, at the European level, conditions similar to those 
within a nation state. The concepts of the Internal Market and the Area of 
Security, Freedom and Justice are emblematic of this purpose. Since the EU 
cannot achieve this purpose by introducing unifying European level taxes or 
police forces, precisely because this would signal a conversion to European 
statehood, it has to rely on coordination and harmonization. Measured 
against the ideal standard of a completely borderless Internal Market or Area 
of Security, Freedom and Justice, this coordination and harmonization can-- 24 - 
not but remain deficient. However, measured against the ideal standard of 
untrammelled state sovereignty in t axation and internal security, the insuffi-
cient state of coordination and harmonization already implies a considerable 
loss of national decision making control.  
The EU is torn between the impulse to create conditions similar to those 
within a state and the impulse not to become a state itself. This tension 
shapes the emergent European multi-level system of taxation and policing. 
This system is decidedly not federal because the EU level lacks what the 
federal level in federal states invariably has: independent tax and police 
power. While in the EU all taxing and police power is vested in the member 
states – there are no European taxes or police forces – most of the taxing and 
police power in federal states is vested in the federal government. In the 
United States for example, federal taxes raise more than two-thirds of all tax 
revenue, and there is a strong federal police force. However, the European 
system is multi-level in the sense that decisions as to what to tax on what 
base and at what rate, or how to put national police forces to work are i n-
creasingly pooled in or even delegated to European institutions. The m o-
nopoly of force and taxation remains national but is embedded in an increas-
ingly dense network of European rules and regulations.  
In a sense, the assignment of government functions in the multi-level sys-
tem of the EU is the reverse of that of a federal multi-level system such as 
the United States. In the United States, the concentration of taxing and p o-
lice powers in the federal government allows for a high degree of decentrali-
zation of decision making: Because federal taxes dwarf sub-national taxes in 
importance, less federal involvement in sub-national taxation is needed in 
order to preserve a sufficient integration of the national market. The decen-
tralization of tax and police powers in the EU, by contrast, requires a much 
higher degree of centralized decision making in order to prevent a fiscal 
fragmentation of or physical barriers in the Internal Market: because all 
taxation and policing is performed by the member states, differences and 
interface problems among the member states are much more important than 
differences and interface problems among the states of the United States.  
The emergence of the European multi-level system of force and taxation 
leads to a Europeanization of the nation state in the EU. The continued exis-
tence of the nation state is not threatened because the legitimacy of the EU is 
premised on preserving it. This means, first and foremost, preserving the 
national monopoly o f force and taxation. However, the state is broken up as - 25 - 
a self-contained system of taxation and policing because many important 
policy decisions are now preformed at the European level.  
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